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Negotiation Patterns for Liberalizing
International Trade in Professional

Services
John H. Bartont

This paper examines possible institutional strategies for liberalizing trade in professional services. It begins by describing those
characteristics of professional service trade that affect the shape
and possibility of international agreements. It then examines experience under U.S. and European Communities formulations for
freedom of trade in professional services. Finally, the paper explores the existing international law that governs the area and examines its liberalization-weighing a multilateral approach under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) against a bilateral approach through the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) network, and outlining plausible multilateral negotiating approaches. Although legal services are emphasized,
consideration is given to other services for the sake of balance and
comparison.
I.

INTRODUCTION

A. The Professional Service Sector
Legal services, medicine, architecture, accounting, management consulting and some educational services are all traded in a
similar economic pattern. As Table 1 demonstrates, legal services
make up only a small portion of the service sector. In government
statistics, for example, lawyers are aggregated with other business
support services, and even then this category generates only about
one-half of the revenue of either accounting or advertising, and
one-fifth of that generated by engineering consultants.

t Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I wish to thank Arthur Alexander, RAND;
Arthur Osteen, American Medical Association; Emery Simons, Office of the United States
Trade Representative; and Michael K. Young, Columbia University School of Law for providing assistance and materials. The errors, of course, are mine.
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Table 1

Estimated Foreign Revenues of Selected Services Sector, 1980
Service Industry

Foreign Revenues
(billions of dollars)

Accounting
Advertising
Business/Professional/Technical services (including law)
Construction and Engineering
Education
Health
Subtotal

$2.35
2.05

Total Service Sector (of which almost half is banking, insurance, and
transportation)

$60.00

1.07
5.36
1.27
0.27
12.37

Source: Derived from Economic Consulting Services, Inc.,'The International Operations of
U.S. Service Industries: Current Data Collection and Analysis 294 (1981).

1. Direct Relationship. Most professional services are provided through a direct working relationship, e.g. lawyer-client or
doctor-patient.' Payment is based roughly on the time required for
the professional to perform the service, and services are only rarely
bundled with one another or with products (in contrast with the
intellectual work embodied in a high-technology product or a literary product).,
This one-on-one service pattern is typical of many components
of the service professions. Indeed, the need to protect individual
consumers from unscrupulous practitioners underlies our view of
the ethical obligations associated with professional services. But
not all service markets are characterized by such a one-on-one relationship between provider and consumer. The legal, accounting
and advertising firms which operate internationally have often
moved abroad in order to service a client which is itself interna' See J. P. de Crayencour, The Professions in the European Community 22-23 (1981).
For a discussion of training, professional ethics and the direct relationship as characteristics
of trade in services see, id. at 18-29.
S For a discussion of "bundling," see Geza Feketekuty, Trade in Professional Services:
An Overview, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F. 1, 4-5; Thierry J. Noyelle and Anna B. Dutka, The
Economics of the World Market for Business Services: Implications for Negotiating Trade
in Services, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F. 57.
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tional; an international law or accounting firm is valued in large
part because it can serve an international corporate client.3 International engineering, architectural, and health-oriented firms, in
contrast, are likely to operate internationally as a result of economies of scale; they provide a complex service requiring the assembly of a variety of expertise, which gives them a competitive advantage in international markets. In neither case is the need to
protect unsophisticated consumers as great as in the paradigmatic
face-to-face transaction.
Still, the one-on-one nature of the relationship persists to the
degree that the client often trusts the professional to define what
services are needed, and to make extremely important strategic decisions which the client is not in a position to evaluate. As a result,
most nations regulate professionals, requiring a demonstration of
ability and often of character, before permitting entry into the profession; they also surround the profession with a certain mystique
and require special insurance and liability arrangements as a precondition to local practice.
2. Local Content and the Scope of Professional Authority.
In some professions, such as law, the expertise required for practice differs sufficiently from nation to nation that it is reasonable
to require a special demonstration of local expertise. Within the
U.S. legal service sector, for example, a demonstration of expertise
is required even at the state level.
Not only does the content of the professional's expertise differ
from nation to nation, the organization and scope of the professional's authority and responsibility vary as well. The lawyer in the
U.S. fulfills the roles of both the barrister and the solicitor in England.4 The French notaire has responsibilities different from both.'
These differences make it difficult to define balanced, common or
reciprocal international arrangements, and severely complicate the
conduct of negotiations on liberalization of trade in professional
services.
3. Autonomy and Self-Regulation. Professional regulations

See generally U.S. National Study on Trade in Services, A Submission by the United
States Government to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 146-50 (1984) ("U.S.
Study") (describing trade in various professions).
.
See Sydney M. Cone, III, The Regulation of Foreign Lawyers 62-63 (1984) ("ABA
Study"). This study was published by the Section on International Law and Practice of the
American Bar Association.
' Id. at 68-70.
See Note, Providing Legal Services in Foreign Countries: Making Room for the
American Attorney, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1767, 1771 (1983).
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are often applied by the profession itself, as through bar or medical
associations. Such autonomy can serve extremely important social
and political functions, helping, for example, to protect the legal
system from improper manipulation by the government or to provide a basis for the independence of the university. Self-regulation,
however, also permits professional societies to limit entry solely to
protect the incomes of their members. Moreover, it complicates international arrangements, because a government's ability to "deliver" on international commitments is limited by the need to respect this independence.
B. Trade in Professional Services
Professional expertise, like a factor of production in manufacturing, is available in different proportions in different societies. As
a result, the economic principle of comparative advantage should
apply to international trade in professional services. Liberalization
of that trade should therefore provide the same mutual benefits
that can be attributed to trade in products.
Nevertheless, trade in professional services has certain special
characteristics that distinguish it from "regular" trade in commodities. Frequently, the movement of people is tied to the "movement" of the service; thus questions of emigration and immigration
are posed. In other cases, because the international service is
adapted to the needs of a multinational corporation, the economic
issues of providing the service are shaped by those surrounding direct foreign investment by the multinational corporation itself.
These issues are best clarified by breaking the abstract concept of
"trade in professional services" into three more concrete forms of
trade: migratory, transient and multinational.
1. Migratory Trade in ProfessionalServices. Migratory trade
in professional services is defined here as trade arising from the
movement of individual professionals to find better practice opportunities in a new nation.7 There are many examples: the immigration of medical specialists into the U.S. during the 1970s;' the emigration of medical expertise from Vienna during much of the early
See also U.S. Study at 39 (cited in note 3).
This flow was large enough that foreign national medical graduates made up over 15
percent of the nation's physicians in 1983. American Medical Association, Proceedings of
the House of Delegates, 38th Interim Meeting 198 (1984) ("AMA Proceedings"). According
to a 1972 calculation, the global emigration of physicians amounted to about one-eighth of
the world's medical school output in 1970 (exclusive of China). A. Mejia, International Migration of Professional Health Manpower, 34 WHO Chronicle 346, 347 (1980).

NEGOTIATION PATTERNS

twentieth century; and the emigration from Egypt of engineering
and legal professionals to oil-wealthy nations during much of the
1970s.1 One can argue that this movement is migration rather than
trade in services. Nevertheless, these movements have the economic effect of reducing the supply of services in one nation and
increasing it in another.
The pressures that give rise to such movement are a combination of the relative accessibility and magnitude of the educational
and research establishments in the sending and receiving nations,
of the price of the service in the two nations, and of the relative
attractiveness of general living conditions in the two nations. Because the movement is shaped by these other factors, and because
it involves a movement of people that may have macroeconomic
consequences and need not induce an economic counterflow of
goods or services, one cannot automatically assume that this trade
is Pareto-optimal; migratory trade may not always lead to efficiency gains.
Established professionals in the importing nation often see the
freedom to migrate from a low-wage situation to a high-wage situation as a threat. More importantly, the exporting nation faces a
"brain drain" problem-typically a poorer nation, it has probably
used public funds to train a professional whose talents would be a
particular benefit to its own society.
But there are counterarguments. First, when higher payments
reflect the possibility of higher productivity in the importing nation, the movement will contribute to the aggregate supply of the
professional service. Second, when those payments are high because of a professional cartel, the entry of new professionals will
help lower the price of the service and thus help the importing
society (although it will harm competitors). Third, as in the case of
emigration from Egypt by engineers and lawyers, the exporting nation may receive a "payment" for the "export" in the form of hard
currency sent back to families by expatriates. Finally, it should be
remembered that the income shifts associated with this type of
movement are not only beneficial for the participants, but also unavoidable for the societies. If migration is not allowed, higher service prices in the nation resisting immigration will render the

9 For discussion of the emigration of professionals from Egypt during the 1970s see
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Brain drain or migration
of talent and skills, in Population Distribution, Migration and Development: Proceedings of
the Expert Group on Population Distribution, Migration and Development 427, 435, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/89 (1984).
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products of that nation less competitive in the world market. Incomes will shift anyway. Any effort to resist this effect by erecting
barriers to trade in these products will encourage the movement of
capital to more efficient areas.
2. Transient Trade. Transient trade in professional services
involves the short-term supply of services across an international
border. The form of expertise may be unusual-Red Adair's team
for fighting oil well fires, or a medical or legal specialist who flies
off to consult on a specific complex case-or it can be one whose
economies of scale transcend the national level such as application
of a very expensive computer-based accounting program or medical
diagnostic facility, or a team of engineering consultants which underbids a local firm on a specific construction project. Such transactions make up a substantial portion of service trade. For example, today "observation, consultation, [and] research" account for
about four-fifths of temporary entries by physicians. 0
Because these services are traded as a discrete unit, the analogy to trade in goods is almost perfect, and principles of comparative advantage should apply." There is generally a direct international payment, so the transaction is just as likely as any other
transaction to induce a counterflow of goods or services. International competition should lead to the optimal allocation of a scarce,
skilled resource.
3. Multinational Trade. Multinational trade in professional
services is defined as trade carried out by the global legal, accounting, and management consulting firms. In contrast with the migratory pattern of trade, there is a sustained tie with a "home" or
"global" firm. In contrast with the transient pattern, there is a long
term investment or establishment in the host country.-2 The service firm, which is permanently present in the host country, but
retains a tie with its home office, is also itself a multinational,1 3

" AMA Proceedings at 196 (cited in note 8). Note that entry for the purpose of consuiting is certainly a form of trade in services. Entry for the purpose of research, education,
or scientific exchange is less likely to produce significant return payments and is probably
not "economic enough" to be regarded as a form of trade in services. Nevertheless, it could
be regarded as an export by the nation in which the education or research is conducted, and
its scientific aspects are enormously important.
" See Feketekuty, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F. at 3-4 (cited in note 2); Noyelle and Dutka,

1986 U. Chi. Legal F. at 83-85 (cited in note 2).
,'U.S. Study at 38 (cited. in note 3) (distinguishing between service trade and service
investment).
" Id. at 128-29. For example, U.S. international health care firms build hospitals as
well as provide health care services. See id. at 149 (noting an increase from sixteen overseas
hospitals "owned, managed, or under construction by U.S. international health care firms"
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and its presence therefore raises some of the same concerns as direct multinational investment. But the critical issue is that the services provided by multinational service firms support direct investment by other multinational corporations.
International service firms often move abroad in order to help
serve international clients. This is, in part, simply good marketing-to build on contacts and a relationship in one nation to obtain business with the same client in another nation. At the same
time, it provides a genuine management efficiency communications among the various national offices of the law or accounting
firm may provide more efficient development and integration of
certain kinds of information than can communications within the
corporation after different branches have consulted separately with
counsel or accountants in each nation."' This is particularly the
case where there are language barriers, or where the corporation is
just beginning (or even considering) operations in the foreign nation.1 5 Thus, the multinational law or accounting firm can provide
an efficient form of help to the multinational corporation.
Kindleberger has argued that unlike pure trade in goods and
portfolio investment, direct investment is not always in the best
interest of the receiving country.16 Direct investment across national boundaries is most common in oligopolistic industries; its
very presence suggests that market imperfections such as high
costs of entry, economies of scale, or a local monopoly have created
an incentive to enter.17 Neither before nor after direct investment
is there likely to be competitive equilibrium. Evaluation of the direct investment thus requires evaluation of two second-best situations. The direct investment will probably turn out to be beneficial, but one cannot be confident of this point as a matter of
theory.
In order to evaluate multinational trade in professional services, it is then necessary to analyze the pro- and anti-competitive
effects of investment by the multinational service firm, and the effects of the multinational direct investment which it supports. It is
clear that multinational service firms can contribute to a given
country's economy by increasing efficiency. But if they do help

in 1978 to fifty-five at the time of the study).
"
See Noyelle and Dutka, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F. at 66-76 (cited in note 2).
"
One of the strong arguments for the freedom of U.S. law firms to operate in Japan is
that the availability of such firms would help United States business to penetrate the Japa-

nese market.

"

See generally Charles Kindleberger, American Business Abroad (1969).

17 Id. at 13-14.
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bring about efficiency gains it is primarily by increasing the efficiency with which other multinational firms operate. The value of
a service firm's contribution to national economies can therefore be
measured accurately only by reference to the contributions made
by the multinational corporations which purchase that firm's services. Considering that those contributions are probably positive in
most cases, liberalization of multinational trade in professional services will generally benefit the importing country. Moreover, as
Geza Feketekuty ably points out in his article, the appropriate way
for a host country to deal with antitrust issues created by direct
investment is to regulate antitrust, rather than foreclosing the possibility of trade in services which is otherwise beneficial."8
4. Issues Common to Migratory, Transient and Multinational Trade. Finally, economics is not the end of the issue for any
form of trade. The intellectual exchange associated with international trade in services is often much more important than the economic aspects. This is partly a matter of the role of communication
in science and technology-such communication, eased by international freedom of trade in services, can speed the advancement of
knowledge and thus benefit all. But there is also an important political benefit. It is hard to imagine that there can be much trade in
legal services without professionals being forced to rethink the role
of the legal system in each nation. The substance of the services
and the ideas of the society are thus likely to evolve and improve
as a result of international trade; in some nations, this may be an
important step toward maintaining an independent legal system
and perhaps even a force which will foster the development of
democracy.1 9
C.

Barriers to Trade in Professional Services

Although this paper cannot review the entire variety of barriers to trade in professional services, a very brief note and review is
important as a prelude to discussion of possible liberalization
strategies. Two kinds of barriers are most important: local control
of the profession and regulation of immigration.
First, as already noted, to practice certain professions, individuals must satisfy a variety of formal requirements, frequently including membership in a national (or state) professional society.
Sometimes, citizenship has been required by the professional soci18

See Feketekuty, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F. at 4 (cited in note 2).
See de Crayencour, The Professions at 9-10 (cited in note 1).
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ety. This type of regulation has its greatest impact on immigrants.
Residency may also be required, or a particular balance among foreign and national partners or associates may be imposed. Such
20
rules have their greatest effect on multinational firms.
Second, visa requirements are a critical form of regulation,
separate from the regulation imposed by the profession itself. For
example, Japan requires U.S. lawyers applying for short-term commercial visas to swear that they will not take depositions in Japan.2 ' Similarly, during the 1970s, the U.S. regulated the inflow of
foreign national medical graduates through a "Visa Qualifying Examination" that tested medical knowledge, and through a requirement of Department of Labor certification that would be issued
only if U.S. citizens of equal ability were unavailable for the job
and if the foreign national's employment would not adversely affect U.S. wages.22 Visa requirements are also a severe problem for
accounting firms interested in transferring personnel for educational and training purposes.2 8
These two types of restrictions are not the only barriers, but
they are the most important ones. In addition, to the extent that
foreign government contracts are involved, as with some engineering consultation services, there may be legal preferences for local
contractors.2 ' Moreover, some nations may subsidize such consulting contracts in an effort to win the construction contracts for their
nationals. There are also a variety of more conventional barriers
such as currency exchange and business establishment
26
restrictions.

II.

EXISTING FORMULATIONS OF FREEDOM OF TRADE IN SERVICES

The U.S. federal system and the European Communities have

*0 For examples of these rules in the legal profession, see generally ABA Study at 41107 (cited in note 4). For a discussion of these barriers in several service industries, see
generally Arthur J. Alexander and Hong W. Tan, Case Studies of U.S. Service Trade in
Japan (Rand Corporation Note) (1984).
21 Id. at 39.
1 AMA Proceedings at 194 (cited in note 8) (describing entrance requirements for
medical doctors). See also Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(32) (1984)
(restricting immigration into the U.S. of graduates of foreign medical schools).
"3 See Frank A. Rossi, Government Impediments and Professional Constraints on the
Operation of International Accounting Firms, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F. 135, 154.
11 U.S. Study at 129-130 (cited in note 3). See also Noyelle and Dutka, 1986 U. Chi.
Legal F. at 82 (cited in note 2).
U.S. Study at 129 (cited in note 3).
See generally id.; Alexander and Tan, Case Studies (cited in note 20); Noyelle and
Dutka, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F. at 79-80 (cited in note 2).
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both developed legal principles oriented toward free trade in services. Although the various European concepts are not distinguished in the same way as those used in the U.S., experiences
with liberalization in the two regions can help us understand the
potential benefits and possible pitfalls of an international legal
principle of freedom of trade in professional services. Because of
the conceptual differences between the two systems, it is best to
compare them in terms of the migratory, transient, and multinational freedom concepts presented above.
A.

Formulations of the Freedom of Migratory Trade in Services

In both the U.S. and the European Communities (EC), the
most straightforward question is whether a person from one jurisdiction should be entitled to come to another and, after satisfying
appropriate tests, to practice his or her profession in the adopted
state or nation. Both the U.S. and the EC have answered this question affirmatively. The U.S. has gone so far as to allow resident
aliens (as well as citizens of another state) to practice law,2 7 while
the EC has declared freedom of professional establishment for nationals of one EC nation in another to be a central element of its
integration strategy. The key issues for both are concern about allegience to the new nation as a condition of practice, maintenance
of professional standards, and whether or not to overrule the autonomy of the local professional association.
There is freedom of movement within both the EC and the
U.S., so questions of immigration are not separately posed. This
greatly simplifies the legal issues and largely eliminates the issue of
immigration control. But the two regions differ in their underlying
levels of professional integration. In the U.S., legal and medical associations from different states cooperate closely. Educational requirements are essentially uniform and parts of the professional
qualifying examinations are even prepared in common. In
medicine, uniform examinations are accepted in most states.28 A
student thus faces little difficulty in preparing in one state for
practice in another.
This has not yet happened within the EC. The European effort has thus had to consider two parallel approaches to the liberalization of service trade, one based on an effort to harmonize edu-

'"

In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
Future Directions for Medical Education 74-75

" American Medical Association,

(1982).
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cational standards, and the other on efforts to ensure that
practitioners from one nation are able to practice in another.
1. The U.S. Approach. In the U.S., freedom of migratory
trade has developed under the Equal Protection Clause. The case
of In re Griffiths29 involved a resident alien who passed the Connecticut bar examination but was refused permission to become a
lawyer because she was not a citizen of the U.S. as Connecticut law
required.
The Supreme Court used straightforward equal protection
analysis to hold that alienage was a "quasi-suspect classification."
A state regulation discriminating against aliens could therefore be
justified only if "its purpose or interest [was] both constitutionally
permissible and substantial, and [only if] its use of the classification [was] 'necessary ...

to the accomplishment' of its purpose or

the safeguarding of its interest."30
The proffered justification was that the lawyer's role as an officer of the court required citizenship-that a resident alien lawyer
might ignore his responsibilities in favor of the interests of a foreign power. The Court found that most of a lawyer's duties, even
when serving as an officer of the court, did not "involve matters of
state policy or acts of such unique responsibility as to [require entrusting] them only to citizens;" nor was citizenship relevant to the
"likelihood that a lawyer [would] fail to protect faithfully the interest of his clients."31 States were therefore barred from requiring
U.S. citizenship as a prerequisite for admission to their bars.
2. The European Approach. The EEC Treaty states, in Article 52, that
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a
Member State in the territory of another Member State shall
be abolished by progressive stages ....

Such progressive abo-

lition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member
State established in the territory of any Member State.
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take
up and pursue activities as self-employed persons ....

32

This provision derives from a thrust toward economic unification,
413 U.S. 717 (1973).
Id. at 721-22.
" Id. at 724.
31 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 52 (signed March 25,
1957) ("EEC Treaty") European Communities, Treaties Establishing the European Communities (1978).
30
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and is, in that sense, closer to the U.S. Privileges and Immunities
Clause to be discussed below. Still, it provides much the same
pressure toward allowing "outsiders"-i.e., nationals of other EEC
Treaty nations-to practice as does the U.S. Equal Protection
Clause.
Like the Equal Protection Clause, the EEC Treaty freedom of
establishment provision can be defeated by adequate countervailing considerations. Article 56 states, in part:
The provisions of this Chapter ... shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation, or administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign
nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public
health.3
Thus, the substantive doctrine is quite similar to that of the
U.S.; procedural arrangements, however, are radically different.
Rather than being "self-executing," this EEC chapter is designed
to be enforced primarily through special directives to be adopted
through a Community legislative process:
In order to make it easier for persons to take up and pursue
activities as self-employed persons, the Council shall, on a
proposal from the Commission after consulting the Assembly.
. issue directives for the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications."'
The harmonization task has proven extremely difficult."' Since ratification of the Treaty in 1957, directives have been issued for the
recognition of diplomas and the coordination of training in only
five medical areas, including veterinary surgery.36 This is much
slower development than was expected.
The leading case, Vincent Auer v. Ministere Public,3 7 involves
establishment of veterinarians. The case demonstrates the benefits
of the harmonization procedure. The relevant directives 8 had been
issued in 1978. The first required each State to recognize diplomas
and certificates from other member states, according to their spe-

31 Id. at art. 56.
' Id. at art. 57.
3' de Crayencour, The Professions at 12-14 (cited in note 1).
3"

European Communities, Study on International Trade in Services 112 (undated)

(copy on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
11 1983 Eur. Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. 2727, [1985] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 123.
88 21 Off. J. Eur. Commun. (No. L. 362) 1 (1978); 21 Off. J. Eur. Commun. (No. L. 362)
7 (1978).
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cific names in each nation. The second concerned the coordination
of national regulatory provisions, and set uniform minimum requirements to be observed in granting the various diplomas and
certificates.
Mr. Auer had received his training in Italy. He had become a
French national, and wished to practice in France. Under French
law, membership in the professional society was a prerequisite to
the right to practice, and the local veterinary association denied
him membership. In spite of the argument that Community law
did not reach the professional rights of a national against his own
government, the European Court of Justice had no difficulty holding for the veterinarian:
It is not permissible to refuse to enter a person on the register
of the professional society on grounds which disregard the validity of a professional qualification obtained in another Member State, when that qualification is one of those which all the
Member States, and their professional societies, as bodies entrusted with a public duty, are required to recognize under
Community law. s"
Thus, not only was the Court clearly ready to override the professional society; it also effectively accepted the Directives' implication that freedom of establishment included the right of a national
to go to another member-state to obtain a professional education
and qualification and then to return to practice in his or her home
nation.4"
Perhaps not unrelated to the delays in negotiating the harmonization of the educational standards, the European Court of Justice rather early gave direct effect to Article 52 (i.e., giving it force
even before the directives had been issued). The case involved was
Reyners v. Belgian State,41 a very close parallel to Griffiths. In
Reyners, a Dutch citizen obtained his diploma in Belgium, but was
prohibited from practicing there because of his foreign nationality.
The Court held that Article 52 was self-executing under these
39

1983 Eur. Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. at 2745, [1985] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 124.

10 In an earlier case involving the same parties, Ministere Public v. Auer, 1979 Eur.
Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. 437, [1979] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 373, the Court held that Auer had
no right under Community law to practice in France until the issuance of the directives
described in text.
1' 1974 Eur. Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. 631, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 305. See also
Thieffry v. Conseil de Y Ordre des Avocats a la Cour de Paris, 1977 Eur. Commun. Ct. J.
Rptr. 765 [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 373 (where a non-national has passed the local
qualifying exam, he or she may practice in spite of lack of national diploma, even though EC
Directives have not been issued).
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circumstances, even rejecting an argument, similar to the "officer
of the court" argument rejected in Griffiths, that the practice of
law was "connected with the exercise of official authority" and
2
therefore exempt from any self-executing effect.
The European system has thus been very effective in protecting the rights of a foreign person who accepts all the costs of local
qualification for practice of a profession. It has been less effective,
however, in harmonizing the qualification requirements in such a
way as to make it easier for professionals trained abroad to practice locally.
B.

Formulations of the Freedom of Transient Trade in
Professional Services

Both the U.S. and the Common Market recognize the freedom
of transient trade in professional services, though both have also
recognized the possibility that there may be countervailing considerations applicable in particular cases. This area, of course, is one
dominated by special expertise and special short-term need: the
need to arrange for an out-of-state lawyer to participate in a particular complex proceeding or for a foreign doctor to help during a
short-term medical emergency. There are some specific arrangements for such short-term or foreign expert participation, exemplified by the New York rules for foreign legal consultants.' 8
Some of the cases frame the issues in terms of the validity of a
residency requirement which may be justified on a variety of
grounds: convenience in the admissions process; ability to observe
an applicant's character; ensuring that the applicant is familiar
with local customs; and ensuring availability to respond to clients'
concerns and to meet potential liabilities." There are also, however, cases going to the short-term forms of participation; here, Europe is more liberal than the U.S..
1. The U.S. Approach. In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,5 the U.S. Supreme Court faced the residence issue
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause (albeit with a doctrine
quite similar to that already described under the equal protection
For background discussion of the same issue, see de Crayencour, The Professions at
97 (cited in note 1).
"' Rules of the Court of Appeals for the Licensing of Legal Consultants, McKinney's
N.Y. Ct. Rules § 521.1(a) (1986), discussed in ABA Study at 30-31 (cited in note 4). See also
Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1787 (cited in note 6).
" See Peggy Ann Ross, The Constitutionality of State Bar Residency Requirements 1
(1982).
,5 105 S.Ct. 1272 (1985).
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doctrine). In resolving it, the Supreme Court made little distinction between transient trade and multinational trade; the implications for possible multistate law firms were mentioned during the
Court's discussion.
Piper had appealing facts: Ms. Piper lived in Vermont, just
across the border from New Hampshire. She had passed the New
Hampshire bar, and hoped to practice there. New Hampshire
would not admit her to its bar because she did not reside in the
state. The Court resolved the issue under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which it described as having been "intended to
create a national economic union." This was inferred from the fact
that the clause derived from the same part of the Articles of Confederation as the Commerce Clause. 48 The Court found that, historically, the clause had given "citizens of State A ... [the privilege] of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality
with the citizens of that State.' 7 As traditionally interpreted, however, the clause guaranteed only those rights "'fundamental' to the
promotion of interstate harmony," and did not include recreational
rights such as that of hunting elk.'8
It was very clear to the Court, however, that, as an occupation,
the practice of law should be viewed as a privilege under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Moreover, the Court argued that
the legal profession has a noncommercial role and duty that
reinforce[s] the view that the practice of law falls within the
ambit of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Out-of-state
lawyers may-and often do-represent persons who raise unpopular federal claims. In some cases, representation by nonresident counsel may be the only means available for the vindication of federal rights.4
Here, as in Griffiths, the state made an "officer of the court" argument; again the Court rejected it. This time the argument was premised on the contention that such an officer, like an elected official, should be a resident and able to participate in the full
political life of the community. The Court responded simply that it
had already concluded in Griffiths that a lawyer is not an officer in
such a political sense.50

41
17

4S

Id. at 1276.
Id., quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
Id., quoting Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).

4'Id. at 1277, citing Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 450 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'o Id. at 1278.
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But, just as with the equal protection doctrine, there may be
exceptions, if there is a substantial reason for treating non-residents differently and a substantial relation between the discrimination and the state's objectives. The state consequently argued
that "nonresident members would be less likely: (i) to become, and
remain, familiar with local rules and procedures; (ii) to behave
ethically; (iii) to be available for court proceedings; and (iv) to do
pro bono and other volunteer work in the State."5' 1 All of these
arguments were rejected as insubstantial. The first two were rejected most easily. A person seeking to practice in a particular jurisdiction would have an incentive to keep up to date. And the incentives to maintain a good reputation as well as the possibility of
being disciplined would be as significant for a non-resident as for a
resident. In regard to the other two arguments, the Court noted
the possibility of less restrictive alternatives, such as requiring
"any lawyer who resides at a great distance to retain a local attorney who will be available for unscheduled meetings and proceedings," or requiring a "nonresident bar member, like the resident
member, . . . to represent indigents and perhaps to participate in
formal legal-aid work." 52
Although the Court has thus come down very sharply against
residence restrictions, it does permit states to restrict pro hac vice
appearances, a form of transient practice involving ad hoc participation in specific cases with the leave of the court. In 1979, over a
strong dissent, the Court rejected any argument for a constitutional right to appear in litigation in another state." There would
almost certainly be no constitutional problem should a state create
a special set of "reasonable" standards and procedures for foreign
lawyers, such as the New York rules for the licensing of legal consultants. Moreover, it should be noted that the Canons of Ethics
support the concept of special appearances:
EC 3-9. The demands of business and the mobility of our society pose distinct problems in the regulation of the practice of
law by the states. In furtherance of the public interest, the

"
"

Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1280.

68 Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979). The Court distinguished this case in a footnote in
Piper:
The nonresident who seeks to join a bar, unlike the pro hac vice applicant, must have
the same professional and personal qualifications required of resident lawyers. Furthermore, the nonresident member of the bar is subject to the full force of New Hampshire's disciplinary rules.
105 S.Ct. at 1278 n. 16.
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legal profession should discourage regulation that unreasonably imposes territorial limitations upon the right of a lawyer
to handle the legal affairs of his client or upon the opportunity of a client to obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice
in all matters including the presentation of a contested matter
in a tribunal before which the lawyer is not permanently ad54
mitted to practice.
2. The European Approach. The European law is similar to
that of the U.S., and derives from a provision for free trade in services that has many similarities to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Nevertheless, the European rule goes further toward guaranteeing access for short-term transient practice. Article 59 states
that
restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall be progressively abolished during the transitional period in respect of nationals of Member States who are
established in a State of the Community other than that of
the person for whom the services are intended.5"
Article 60 adds:
Services shall be considered to be "services" within the meaning of this Treaty where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by the provisions
relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons [which includes the special medical provisions discussed
above].
"Services" shall in particular include:
(d) activities of the professions.
[T]he person providing a service may, in order to do so,
temporarily pursue his activity in the State where the service
is provided, under the same conditions as are imposed by that
State on its own nationals.5 6
Subsequent articles include authority for enforcement through
directives comparable to those issued under the establishment provisions. A general program for the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide services has been issued,51 as well as a directive
American Bar Association, Model Code of Professional Responsibility 19-20 (1982).
EEC Treaty at art. 59 (cited in note 32).
Id. at art. 60.
W Programme generale pour la suppression des restrictions a la liberte d'etablissement,
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detailing freedom of trade in services with respect to lawyers.5s
9 the
In addition, in Van Binsbergen v. Bedrijfsvereniging,"
Court declared that the provisions are, at least in part, selfenforcing:
the first paragraph of Article 59 and the third paragraph
of Article 60 [both quoted above] have direct effect and may
therefore be relied on before national courts, at least in so far
as they seek to abolish any discrimination against a person
providing a service by reason of his nationality or of the fact
that he resides in a Member State other than that in which
the service is to be provided. 0
...

As suggested in the preceding case, the case law under Article
60 prohibits both (1) national regulations or restrictions that discriminate against nationals of other nations in the community, and
(2) non-discriminatory measures that obstruct the cross-frontier
supply of services." The first implication is roughly parallel to the
Privileges and Immunities Clause; the second to the Commerce
Clause. 2 The European Court of Justice dealt with the need for
this second thrust in a case in which the complaint was the burden
of multiple licensing in several nations-the requirement for a license in each state was imposed in a non-discriminatory fashion,
but the combination was arguably a burden.6 3
A critical exception has evolved, which contains a substantial
portion of the content of the law. This exception, the "judicial exception," allows a state to regulate foreign professionals in order to
guard against the problems created by a foreign service supplier
who does not have a continuing presence in the jurisdiction. This
exception was first defined in Van Binsbergen, where the court
said:

5 J. Off. Commun. Eur. 36 (1962).
" 20 Off. J. Eur. Commun. (No. L. 78) 17 (1977). Note that this is a different type of

directive from that issued for the medical professions. The medical directive concerns the
harmonization of diploma requirements and mutual recognition of diplomas; the legal directive governs the provision of services across national boundaries. For further discussion of
these provisions, see de Crayencour, The Professions at 96-100 (cited in note 1).
1974 Eur. Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. 1299, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 298.
1974 Eur. Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. at 1312, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 314.
61 Philippe Chappatte, Freedom to Provide Insurance Services in the European Community, 9 Eur. L. Rev. 3, 10 (1984).
Compare Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1276 n.7.
" Ministere Public v. Van Wesemael, 1979 Eur. Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. 35, [1979] 3
Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 87. For a discussion of Van Wesemael, see Chappatte, 9 Eur. L. Rev.
at 10 (cited in note 61).
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However, taking into account the particular nature of the services to be provided, specific requirements imposed on the
person providing the service cannot be considered incompatible with the Treaty where they have as their purpose the application of professional rules justified by the general
good-in particular rules relating to organization, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and liability-which are
binding upon any person established in the State in which the
service is provided, where the person providing the service
would escape from the ambit of those rules being established
in another Member State.
Likewise a Member State cannot be denied the right to
take measures to prevent the exercise by a person providing
services whose activity is entirely or principally directed towards its territory of the freedom [to provide services within
the Common Market] guaranteed by Article 59 for the purpose of avoiding the professional rules of conduct which would
be applicable to him if he were established within that State;
such a situation may be subject to judicial control under the
provisions of the chapter relating to the right of establishment
and not of that on the provision of services. "
The Court thus permitted restrictions under certain conditions: (1) where the rules, exemplified by the ethical rules of the
legal profession, serve the general interest; (2) where they are applied to professionals within the nation as well as to "foreign" professionals; (3) where the supplier of services is not subject to
equivalent regulation in his or her home state; and (4) where there
is no less restrictive alternative approach to providing the
05
services.
The content of these rather abstract provisions can best be filled out by specific examples. Under this exception, several regulations have survived judicial scrutiny. In Procureur du Roi v.
Debauve,6 6 the Court upheld a state regulation prohibiting the
transmission of advertisements by cable television in light of the
great differences in national regulation in the area. Alfred John
Webb 67 involved licensing of a cross-frontier supplier of labor services when the home nation and recipient nation used significantly
different standards. In both cases the Court found that the regula1974 Eur. Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. at 1309, [19751 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 312.
See Chappatte, 9 Eur. L. Rev at 11 (cited in note 61).
1980 Eur. Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. 833, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 362.
o 1981 Eur. Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. 3305, [1982] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 719.
'
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tions rested on reasonable state interests and that the regulatory
approaches in the various states were so different that local regulation was required.
In three major cases, the European Court of Justice struck
down regulations that did not fall within the exception. Van Binsbergen dealt with residence requirements for legal representation
before certain Dutch tribunals. Coenen v. Sociaal-Economische
Raad68 dealt with another Dutch regulation, this one requiring certain insurance intermediaries to maintain both residence and an
69
office in the Netherlands. Ministere Public v. Van Wesemae
dealt with a requirement that cross-frontier employment agencies
for entertainers obtain a license in the state where they were working, when they were already subject to home-state licenses and supervision of all their activities. Had such regulations been at issue
in the U.S., they might have been struck down under the Commerce Clause or have been found not to satisfy the substantiality
standard under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
C.

Formulations of the Freedom of Multinational Trade in
Services

When a host or importing state considers multinational trade
in services, the concerns are quite similar to those raised by transient trade-with two major differences. There is the additional
possibility that the multinational firm will present a monopolistic
threat to the profession. At the same time, such firms are less
likely to be dealing with consumers than are the small firms; there
is therefore less need for regulatory supervision.
The closest U.S. case deals with multinational trade in services
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the doctrine otherwise applicable to transient trade; the leading European case handles the issue under the provision for freedom of establishment,
the doctrine otherwise applicable to migratory trade.
1. The U.S. Approach. In the U.S., there is very little law on
this issue. The clearest indications are those of Supreme Court of
70
New Hampshire v. Piper,
discussed above. A dissenting judge in
the lower court noted that abolition of the residency requirement
might permit "large law firms in distant states" to exert significant
influence over the state bar.7 1 The dissent in Piper picked up the
S 1975 Eur. Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. 1547, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 30.
" 1979 Eur. Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. 35, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 87.

70 105 S.Ct. 1272 (1985).
71 Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 723 F.2d 110, 119 (1st Cir. 1983). The
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same point, noting that Boston lawyers might end up playing a
major role in New Hampshire." The Court's only direct response
was a footnote saying that the desire to protect.local lawyers from
competition was not "substantial" and that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was "designed primarily to prevent such economic
protectionism. 7 3 It thus seems unlikely that the Court will resist
multistate law practice on any grounds short of explicit antitrust
policy.
2. The European Approach. The issue, however, has been
posed quite explicitly in Europe, through a case testing a French
regulation prohibiting French avocats from having foreign offices.
In Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Rechtsanwalt Onno
Klopp,7 " a Dusseldorf lawyer with a doctorate from the University
of Paris wished to maintain his Dusseldorf office while opening an
office in Paris. He was refused admission to the Paris bar on the
basis of a Paris bar rule permitting a member to'maintain chambers only within the Paris area. This rule was justified as a way to
ensure that the court and clients would have ready access to the
lawyer, a factor said to be particularly important in the French
procedural system. Concern was also expressed about the possibility of inconsistent ethical obligations.
For the European Court of Justice, this was a freedom of establishment, not a freedom of trade in services, issue. Although it
mentioned directives governing the freedom of legal establishment7 5 the Court relied for its decision on Article 52. The Court
struck down the Paris Bar rule rather easily, saying that Article 52
directly envisioned the "right to set up and maintain, in compliance with professional rules, more than one centre of activity in
Community territory." The European Court noted that:
In view of the special nature of the legal profession, however,
the second Member State must have the right, in the interests
of the due administration of justice, to require that lawyers
enrolled at a Bar in its territory should practise in such a way
as to maintain sufficient contact with their clients and the judicial authorities and abide by the rules of the profession.
Nevertheless such requirements must not prevent the nationals of other Member States from exercising properly the right

Supreme Court discussed this issue at 105 S.Ct. at 1275-76.
105 S.Ct. at 1283 n. 3.
105 S.Ct. at 1279 n. 18.
7' 1984 Eur. Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. 2971, [1985] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 99.
78 20 Off. J. Eur. Commun. (No. L. 78) 17 (1977).
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of establishment guaranteed them by the Treaty."
It added that "modern means of transportation and telecommunications make it possible to maintain' 7 the appropriate contact with
the judicial authorities and clients."

D.

Implications for International Negotiations

This review of U.S. and EC experiences with the liberalization
of trade in professional services suggests several lessons which
must be taken into account in any new international negotiations.
First, although a principle of non-discrimination between national and foreign professionals is essential, it is not a strong
enough basis to build effective freedom for either transient or multinational practice. Specific rights beyond non-discrimination will
have to be defined.s
Second, any international agreement will have to face a variety
of specific and difficult technical problems: (1) the desire of the
professional associations for autonomy; (2) the desire of each nation to maintain reasonable professional standards (sometimes in
the face of radically different national traditions); and (3) the need
to balance other substantive arguments for parochialism (local ethical traditions, availability to clients, etc.) against the desire for
openness.
Third, the approach of defining conditions under which foreign nationals can practice a profession is far more likely to succeed in the short run than is the approach of harmonizing educa79
tional requirements for the professions.

Fourth, progress (especially toward harmonization) will be
strongly favored by the existence of an international association of
the relevant professional associations (even if these associations do
not initially favor freedom of trade).80
Fifth, any but the most narrow formulation of freedom of
trade in services is likely to reach more than one of the forms of
trade discussed in this paper. It will be very difficult to improve
the opportunities for multinational law firms, for example, without
raising issues of migratory practice.
76

1984 Eur. Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. at 2990, [1985] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 114.

77

Id.

"' See Arthur J. Alexander and Hong W. Tan, Barriers to U.S. Service Trace in Japan
37 (Rand Corporation Note) (1984) ("national treatment is not the solution, it is the
problem").
79 See de Crayencour, The Professions at 13-14, 20 (cited in note 1).
"' See Id. at 59-60.
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III.

CURRENT INTERNATIONAL MODELS FOR FREEDOM OF

TRADE IN SERVICES

For some time, the U.S. has been pressing for a global ap-

proach to trade in services."' This presumably includes professional services and might lead to a separate code negotiated within
the GATT framework, which would cover professional services either alone or with some other group of services.
Nevertheless, debate with respect to efforts to open the Japanese market for U.S. law firms 82 has focused primarily on the
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty (FCN) between the
two nations. 83 It therefore makes sense to discuss the contributions
of the GATT approach and of the FCN network separately. Together with the previous analysis, the lessons learned provide the
basis for outlining an international agreement structure appropriate to trade in services. "
A.

The GATT Approach

Although GATT is intended to govern trade in goods, not services, its existing concepts could fairly readily be extended to apply to professional services. There have previously been GATT
side-agreements in other areas,85 there is no reason that one could

See, for example, Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. § 2114a(a)(1) (1984), setting out negotiating objectives:
"(A) to reduce or to eliminate barriers to, or other distortions of, international trade in
services (particularly United States service sector trade in foreign markets), including
barriers that deny national treatment and restrictions on the establishment and operation in such markets; and
(B) to develop internationally agreed rules, including dispute settlement procedures,
which •(i) are consistent with the commercial policies of the United States, and
(ii) will reduce or eliminate such barriers or distortions and help ensure open international trade in services.
This is supplemented by authorization to the President to restrict foreign access to the
United States service market, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1984), and by requirements for a series of
studies and of services to help service exporters. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2114b, 2114c, 2114d (1984).
" See Alexander and Tan, Case Studies at 42-44 (cited in note 20). See generally Issac
Shapiro and Michael K. Young, The Role of Law and Lawyers in Japan and the United
States, 1985 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. 25.
83 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S.
No. 2863, 206 U.N.T.S. 143 (signed April 2, 1953) ("U.S.-Japan FCN").
8' In addition, Article 13 of the OECD Code of Liberalisation requires the elimination
of barriers to transfers of funds and to transactions with respect to invisible transactions.
Annex B explains that these provisions also cover technical assistance. See Organisation for
European Economic Co-Operation and Development, Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations, Annex B (1973). See also U.S. Study at 45-47 (cited in note 3).
86 Agreement on Government Procurement, reprinted in Contracting Parties to the
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not be developed for services. And the GATT structure already includes a side-agreement dealing with technical standards, as well
as arrangements for dispute settlement.
1. The Principle of Non-discrimination. The GATT provision closest to the necessary statement of basic obligation is Article
111(2):
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall
be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.86
This provision derives from the underlying GATT concept that all
trade barriers should be assimilated to tariffs, which can then be
negotiated down. Many products can be stopped at the border
under a variety of GATT rules; the point of Article 111(2) is to
ensure that the barriers to imported goods end at the border.
This statement could be applied to services mutatis mutandis,
and would at least produce an obligation of non-discrimination
with respect to trade in professional services. Such a principle
could be stated on a multilateral basis; it is analogous to the Equal
Protection Clause's hostility to discrimination against aliens.
As the preceding discussion makes clear, however, more is
needed. With respect to any form of professional trade, there is no
guarantee that those who seek to practice will be allowed to enter
the country; they can be barred by immigration rules, which would
work in a manner analogous to tariffs or import quotas. Moreover,
the review of previous experience shows a variety of circumstances
in which obligations beyond non-discrimination are necessary. The
requirement of residence, for example, is non-discriminatory but
would effectively bar transient practice. Neither is the provision, as
it stands, very helpful in resolving the problems of evaluating qualifications standards as possible barriers to trade. Thus, although
the GATT side-agreements concept could be adapted for professional services, there would have to be a new and relatively detailed set of obligations, stating a duty of non-discrimination, and
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 8
(26th Supp. 1980) (signed April 12, 1979) ("BISD"); Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, 31 U.S.T. 405, T.I.A.S. No. 9616, BISD at 8 (signed April 12, 1979); International
Dairy Arrangement, 31 U.S.T. 679, T.I.A.S. No. 9623, BISD at 91 (signed April 12, 1979).
"' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. 111(2), 61 Stat. pt. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 (signed October 30, 1947).
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going further to require or prohibit a variety of specific practices.
Some of these may be developed from other GATT areas; others
will need to be developed afresh, or brought in from sources like
the European and U.S. provisions described above.
2. Technical Standards.At the Tokyo Round, an Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade was negotiated,8 7 the relevant concepts of which could readily be extended to govern national (and
state) professional entry standards. Article 2.1 of this agreement
includes a general statement of obligation:
Parties shall ensure that technical regulations and standards
are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to creating
obstacles to international trade. Furthermore, products imported from the territory of any Party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin and to like products originating in any other
country in relation to such technical regulations or
88
standards.
The statement goes on to call for the use of international standards where possible, but it also notes the right of parties to reject
these standards on grounds such as "national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; [and] protection for
human health or safety." ' The agreement also includes a series of
subsidiary obligations governing testing and certification procedures and setting up specific dispute settlement approaches. It further requires governments to "take reasonable measures to ensure"
that non-governmental bodies do not undercut the concept of the
agreement.
This agreement thus provides a model for a global approach to
ensure that professional qualification requirements do not create
unnecessary barriers to migratory or multinational entry. It includes positive obligations beyond non-discrimination. A residency
requirement, for example, could, by analogy, be rejected if it had
"the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international
trade," and was not justified on public interest grounds analogous
"

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (cited in note 85).
" Id. at art. 2.1.
89 Id. at art. 2.2. Note that the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 includes a similar list of
factors to be taken into account in negotiating liberalized trade in services: "domestic objectives including, but not limited to, the protection of legitimate health or safety, essential
security, environmental, consumer or employment opportunity interests." 19 U.S.C.
§ 2114a(a)(2).
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to those of preventing "deceptive practices" or protecting "human
health." Moreover, the approach could be combined with efforts to
harmonize educational standards and qualifications. The Agreement does not, however, help in dealing with freedom of transient
trade, where what is at issue are precisely qualifications that are
different from those normally required of a local professional.
3. Other Substantive Codes. The Tokyo Round also resulted
in the promulgation of a Subsidies/Countervailing Measures Code,
which prohibits export subsidies on products other than certain
primary products." Such an obligation could be extended to reach
the various governmental practices of subsidizing consulting and
engineering export services in an effort to obtain the follow-on
heavy export contracts.
It should be noted, however, that an effort to extend the entire
paraphernalia of countervailing duties and anti-dumping provisions to professional services would produce enormous and unnecessary confusion. Many service firms charge different prices to different clients, either out of a sense of professional obligation or out
of a hope of obtaining follow-on business. This price discrimination
(or internal cross-subsidy) would cause widespread allegations of
dumping; it would also make it very difficult to define a subsidy
amount accurately.
Finally, to the extent that governments are sometimes buyers
of professional services, the Agreement on Government Procurement could also be extended to cover professional services.9 1 With
a number of exceptions, this code prohibits discrimination against
foreign firms in the procurement of products and of "services incidental to the supply of products if the value of these incidental
services does not exceed that of the products themselves." 2
4. Dispute Settlement. The GATT dispute settlement procedures, including the specific procedures associated with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, are very weak. The fundamental approach is to seek resolution through diplomatic
consultation, followed, if there is no settlement, by appeal to a
panel which evaluates the alleged violation. Should the panel find
a violation, the injured nation may be authorized to retaliate by
90 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, 31
U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, BISD at 56 (signed April 12, 1979).
"' Agreement on Government Procurement, art. 1.1 (cited in note 85). See also U.S.
Study at 52 (cited in note 3).
2 Agreement on Government Procurement, art. 1.1(a) (cited in note 85).
" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIII (cited in note 86).
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restricting exports from the offending nation to the offended nation. The Technical Barriers agreement adds to this panoply of
consultations the possibility of a panel of technical experts able to
94
evaluate scientific arguments in a particular case.
Experience, particularly that associated with the U.S.-Japanese dispute over multinational access to Japan's legal market,
suggests the inadequacy of this procedure. U.S. law firms believe
that they can work on certain foreign and international legal issues
in Japan without, under Japanese law, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. They have not, however, been able to obtain
visas, because the Japanese government argued that it must first
work out delicate negotiations with the Japanese Federation of Bar
Associations. Those negotiations now appear to have produced a
settlement of some kind, although American law firms have voiced
some dissatisfaction with the new Japanese rules.9 5 More important, however, is the fact that U.S. law firms had no procedure in
Japan for bringing these issues to a head-and they were left out
during the period of delay. Additional rights to hasten a legal resolution within Japan would clearly have been useful.
The GATT dispute settlement approach has other relevant
limitations. First, it depends in significant part on political access
in the petitioning nation. American multinational law firms can
reach the U.S. government with their concerns-but what about
the migrant who has left his or her home nation behind? Or even
the U.S.-based anti-establishment law group seeking to vindicate a
human rights interest abroad? The latter case is precisely the international analogue of the enforcement of federal rights noted in
Piper as such an important attribute of the nonresident lawyer.
The problem with the GATT approach is not simply one of
diplomatic priorities; it is also one of the suitability of the obvious
GATT sanctions of terminating an import. The GATT structure
leaves a nation little choice but to use this sanction of cutting off
an import-but there are serious questions whether it is ever wise
to retaliate against the reverse flow of professional services. Although the political and retaliatory aspects of the GATT procedure may ultimately offer the only approach available on the international level, it would be wise to supplement them as far as
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 14.9, Annex 2 (cited in note 85).
95 See Alexander and Tan, Case Studies at 39-62 (cited in note 20). See also Shapiro
and Young, 1985 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. at 36-42 (cited in note 82); Sydney M. Cone
III, Government Trade Policy and the Professional Regulation of Foreign Lawyers, 1986 U.
Chi. Legal F. 169, 183-88.
94
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possible.
B.

The FCN Approach

As demonstrated by the visa issue in the U.S.-Japan dispute,
the GATT approach fails to resolve the difficult problem of gaining
access to the nation. Without a major change in formulation (more
than an application by analogy), it cannot help the migratory or
transient professional enter the nation. Within the European Community or the U.S., both of which look to a common labor market,
there is no problem gaining access. In nearly all other contexts,
however, freedom of professional trade requires modification of
fundamental assumptions of immigration policy. Such modification
has been achieved in limited fashion within the context of FCN
treaties.
Because it is typical of a number of treaties, and is relevant to
the U.S.-Japan conflict, the FCN treaty with Japan will be used as
a model. The most directly relevant section is Article VIII:
1. Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel,
attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice. Moreover, such nationals and companies shall be permitted to engage accountants and other technical experts regardless of the
extent to which they may have qualified for the practice of a
profession within the territories of such other Party, for the
particular purpose of making examinations, audits and technical investigations exclusively for, and rendering reports to,
such nationals and companies in connection with the planning
and operation of their enterprises, and enterprises in which
they have a financial interest, within such territories.
2. Nationals of either party shall not be barred from practicing the professions within the territories of the other Party
merely by reason of their alienage; but they shall be permitted
to engage in professional activities therein upon compliance
with the requirements regarding qualifications, residence and
competence that are applicable to nationals of such other
Party."

There is a controversy concerning the implications of paragraph 1 for lawyers. The first sentence mentions lawyers; the secU.S.-Japan FCN, art. VIII (cited in note 83).
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ond omits them. Thus, it can be argued that this paragraph permits a U.S. firm practicing in Japan to have counsel of its choice,
but its choice would have to be limited to those qualified to practice in Japan. The legislative history, which has been partially declassified, contains arguments supporting both interpretations.
There is no controversy, however, concerning the second paragraph. At the insistence of the U.S. Senate, in the pre-Griffiths era,
the U.S. made a reservation whose effect was to exclude lawyers:
Article VIII, Paragraph 2, shall not extend to professions
which, because they involve the performance of functions in a
public capacity or in the interest of public health and safety,
are state-licensed and reserved by statute or constitution exclusively to citizens of the country, and no most-favored-nation clause in the said Treaty shall apply to such
professions.9
The reservation was accepted by Japan on an understandably reciprocal basis:
Japan reserves the right to impose prohibitions or restrictions on nationals of the U.S. of America with respect to practicing the professions referred to in Article VIII, paragraph 2,
to the same extent as States . . . to which such nationals belong impose prohibitions or restrictions on nationals of Japan
with respect to practicing such professions. 9
There is an argument that Japan's reciprocity condition has now
been met-but the history, and the U.S. reservation, place the U.S.
in a weak position for arguing that the legal profession is covered
by the Treaty.
In addition, it should be noted that Article I provides the international basis for a "treaty trader" or "treaty investor" visa:

See Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1814-15 (cited in note 6). There has been significant
recent litigation with respect to this provision. In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982), the provision was held not to confer rights on a local subsidiary.

This will have implications for the organization of a multinational firm of almost any type.
More recently, the Civil Rights Acts were held to prevail in an arguable conflict with the
analogous provisions in the FCN treaty with Greece. Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d
363 (6th Cir. 1984).
" Exchange of Notes appended to U.S.-Japan FCN, 4 U.S.T. at 132, 206 U.N.T.S. at
230 (cited in note 83). The Senate applied similar reservations in treaties with Denmark,
Israel, and Germany. See Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1814-15 n. 255 (cited in note 6). See
generally U.S. Study at 40-41 (cited in note 3).
Exchange of Notes appended to U.S.-Japan FCN, 4 U.S.T. at 132, 206 U.N.T.S. at
230 (cited in note 83).
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1. Nationals of either Party shall be permitted to enter
the territories of the other Party and to remain therein: (a) for
the purposes of carrying on trade between the territories of
the two Parties and engaging in related commercial activities;
(b) for the purpose of developing and directing the operations
of an enterprise in which they have invested. . . a substantial
amount of capital. 0 0
It is very difficult to rely on these provisions in the specific
case-the Senate's position on specific language in the 1950s makes
it hard to present a contrary interpretation of general language in
the 1980s. Nevertheless, these provisions do show the possibility of
requiring that a visa be granted-which is exactly what the FCN
treaty does in a situation similar to that of multinational practice.
Although the FCN treaty is typically bilateral, there seems to
be no reason not to include the equivalent of a treaty trader or
treaty investor provision in a multilateral treaty so that, at least,
the transient and multinational professionals would be able to provide services under circumstances that are professionally significant, but do not threaten the recipient nation's immigration policy.
It may be hard to extend the concept further to define a global
duty to permit migratory freedom of trade in professional services,
but even this is conceivable, under some appropriate limits. 10
IV. POSSIBLE AGREEMENT PATTERNS
The above analysis provides a range of background models
that can help in designing approaches to encouraging freedom of
trade in professional services. This final section will first explore
the possible contents of international agreements for freedom of
trade in professional services; it will then turn briefly to the choice
of negotiating frameworks.

1*0U.S.-Japan FCN at art. I (cited in note 83). For United States implementation, see
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E); 22 CFR §§ 41.40, 41.41.
"I The new bilateral investment treaties are exemplified by the (Draft) U.S.-Panama
Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments (signed October 27, 1982),
reprinted in 21 Int'l Legal Mat. 1227 (1982). It includes a provision (similar to U.S-Japan

FCN Article VIII) permitting investors:
to engage, within the territory of the other party, professional, technical and managerial personnel of their choice, regardless of nationality, for the particular purpose of
rendering professional, technical and managerial assistance necessary for planning and
operation of their investment.
Id. at art. 3.2, 21 Int'l Legal Mat. at 1231. It should be noted, however, that one of the areas
in which Panama reserved "the right to make or to maintain limited exceptions" is the
"practice of liberal professions." 21 Int'l Legal Mat. at 1240.
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A.

Shaping Assumptions

Two important and interrelated questions must first be considered, because they shape the rest of the approach. First, precisely which forms of freedom of trade in professional services
should be sought? Second, how should a negotiating effort respond
to national government desires to protect the autonomy of immigration policy, an autonomy that may conflict with freedom of
trade in professional services?
1. Choice of Forms of Trade. The form of trade of greatest
interest to the U.S. is multinational trade. The beneficiaries of the
liberalization of such trade would be the major international professional firms, which are mainly U.S. firms. Within the developed
world, freedom of trade in this area would thus appear as a concession granted to the U.S., primarily by Europe and Japan, but also
by the rest of the world.
Some development economists argue that such freedom of
trade in professional services is bad, because the U.S. multinational service firms are likely to increase their power. 02 This argument rings false, however: it is far more important to the developing nations that their governments, their citizens, and local and
foreign firms receive the best advice they can get. Freedom of professional trade may threaten some governments, but it is much
more likely than not to further the development of national societies. Any risk of domination by a few U.S. firms is better faced by
antitrust limitations on those firms than by blanket limits on trade
in professional services.
Transient trade is even more important. It is, as noted
above,108 probably the most unequivocally beneficial form of trade
from an economic or intellectual viewpoint. Migratory trade is the
most difficult kind of trade to assess. It is likely to be economically
efficient and difficult to distinguish from multinational trade-but
it raises serious immigration policy and "brain drain" questions.
The benefits of migratory trade are probably greater for a
number of developing nations to whom the remittances are important. This form of migration is also beneficial in human terms for
the people involved and may offer highly effective educational and
scientific values as well. Although the point is likely to raise political questions, the right answer here is probably to include this
102See, e.g., Murray Gibbs, Continuing the International Debate on Services, 19 J.

World Trade L. 199 (1985); Brigid Gavin, New Horizons in International Trade: Towards
Free Trade in Services, 39 World Today 194 (1983).
"' See text at notes 10-11.
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form of trade, but to recognize that it will necessarily be subject to
some restrictions, such as limits on the number of people that may
be involved. Such an approach would permit the communication
and intellectual benefits of the trade, as well as some market adjustment benefits, but would reduce the serious political risks.
2. The Visa Issue. The state laws of the U.S. and the national laws of EC members were structured for regions in which
there is freedom of movement without serious immigration or visa
control. For most of the world, this is unrealistic; in general, nations are willing to give up control over immigration policy only in
the bilateral context of FCN treaties governing the relatively limited flow of treaty investors and treaty traders. Perhaps this pattern is still the only option, implying that any new multilateral arrangements would have to be implemented through supplementary
bilateral arrangements, and that the freeing of migratory trade in
services is essentially unrealistic.
The GATT-based model, an Article XIX safeguards approach,1 04 is clearly inappropriate, because economic harm to a
particular industry, the focus of that provision, is only one of the
concerns behind a nation's immigration policy. 10 5 One could also
conceive of more specific limitations designed to ensure that any
agreement concessions are not illusory. There might be, for example, a right to impose a numerical limitation or quota (which would
provide protection for services produced by domestic professionals). This could be more or less explicitly based on population or
GNP or on economic conditions within the profession; it could
even be defined in a way that takes into account the international
market share of an incoming professional firm in order to meet the
fear of foreign or multinational monopoly.
Such arrangements, however, seem unlikely. It is not only
likely to be difficult to negotiate any arrangements affecting
visas," ° ' but also likely to appear imprudent and elitist to negotiate

'" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XIX (cited in note 83). Entitled
"Emergency Action on Import of Particular Products," this article authorizes trade restrictions when necessary to prevent "serious injury to domestic producers."
105Except in some specific narrow contexts, the European Communities' concept of
"public policy" or "ordre public" is equally inadequate. This principle, as interpreted by the
European Court, provides a basis to deny freedom of movement in individual cases where,
for example, there is concern of subversion or drug addiction. See, e.g., Regina v. Bouchereau, 1977 Eur. Commun. Ct. J. Rptr. 1999, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 800. It does not,
however, provide the broader restrictions that may be politically crucial to achieving any
widespread increase in professional mobility.
'06 The U.S. Study strongly resisted any suggestion that immigration issues should be
considered in GATT. U.S. Study at 39 (cited in note 3).
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such arrangements with respect to professionals when there are so
many other employed and unemployed persons with a stronger
claim on the opportunity to migrate.
Yet, if the issue is ignored, concessions with respect to trade in
professional services are likely to prove illusory for their beneficiaries. Hence, the most plausible and feasible approach is probably to include general language that provides a basis for diplomatic
(and perhaps legal) representation that greater freedom to obtain
visas is warranted in a specific case. This risks encouraging a bilateral reciprocity-based approach-which favors more powerful nations. It is probably, however, the best that is available for migratory and multinational trade in services. Stronger language might
be feasible in the transient trade context, where the economics are
stronger and the countervailing political concerns are generally
10 7
weaker.
B.

Important Agreement Provisions

The less difficult points can now be spelled out in terms of
specific negotiating goals:
1. Basic Freedoms. As suggested by the analysis above and
by European experience, freedom of migratory and multinational
trade should rest initially on non-discrimination and foreign rights
of access, as opposed to harmonization of professional entry requirements. Thus, for these purposes, any agreement should include at least the following as requirements for the government itself or for the government to impose on the relevant professional
associations:"°8
* Non-discrimination against foreign party nationals in rights
of access to the market for professional services, including the
right to join professional societies or to establish a firm; transparency of membership provisions; and the right to use one's
own firm name when appropriate (upon satisfying various
requirements).

107 Alternatively, one could envision a new convention oriented toward simplifying the
visa process for the entire variety of transient professionals, including athletes and entertainers as well as the other bodies of professionals discussed in the text. There has been
some parallel effort in the tourist area and in particular bilateral and regional contexts. See,
e.g., Marjorie M. Whiteman, 8 Dig. Int'l L., ch. 22 § 15 (abolition of passports), 9 Dig. Int'l
L., ch. 27 § 34 (simplification of frontier formalities).
108For other lists of specific points to consider in defining freedom of trade in professional services, see de Crayencour, The Professions at 81-88 (cited in note 1); Note, 83
Colum. L. Rev. at 1795-1812 (cited in note 6).
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- Good-faith commitments by each nation to issue visas as
reasonably needed for foreign nationals wishing to practice a
profession in accordance with the remainder of the agreement.
* Stronger commitments, such as those nations make under
FCN treaties, to grant temporary visas as necessary for transient practice in accordance with the rest of the agreement.
2. Profession-by-ProfessionProvisions. The above provisions

amount to a non-discrimination "umbrella," and must, as exemplified by the U.S. and European experience, be supplemented by
specific provisions that go beyond non-discrimination. These are
probably best drafted on a profession-by-profession basis. They
include:
- Affirmative obligations to shape domestic rules (including
certification procedures and educational arrangements, and
possibly including financial support during training periods)' 19
to allow foreigners realistic access to the domestic service
market and to avoid constituting de facto barriers. 10 It is possible that for some professions, such as law, the affirmative
obligations might be satisfied by creating a category of foreign
expert, with the authorities and rights needed to help international firms and work on international issues."'
• It may also be necessary for each nation to shape rules for
transient practice of each profession, under which entry would
be based on a certification that the expert had met home-nation standards, and under which practice might be limited to
specific short periods, specific types of controversies or emergencies, or specific areas of expertise (e.g., knowledge of foreign law). This could perhaps be integrated with the foreign
109 This question of financial support is important in many contexts, including, for ex-

ample, during preparation for Japanese legal practice, Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1775
(cited in note 6), and during the residency component of United States medical training,
John K. Inglehart, Health Policy Report: Reducing Residency Opportunities for Graduates
of Foreign Medical Schools, 313 New Eng. J. Med. 831 (1985).
, 0 One of the hard practical negotiating questions is whether to resist protection systems (like those for Japanese lawyers) said to rest, at least in part, on sociological rather
than economic goals. But see Shapiro and Young, 1985 Mich. Y.B. Legal Stud. at 31 (cited
in note 82) (arguing that the portions of the legal profession being protected in Japan represent only a small component of what is considered the legal profession in the U.S.). See
also Arthur J. Alexander and Hong W. Tan, Barriers to Entry and Income of Lawyers in
International Practice in Japan (Rand Corporation Note) (1986), for analysis of the economics of the current Japanese situation.
"I Examples include the New York concept of a foreign legal consultant and the Japanese proposals for a comparable but heavily-restricted category. See Shapiro and Young,
1985 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. at 36-42 (cited in note 82).
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expert-type provision already described.
- In some cases the special rules would take quite different
forms (e.g., third-party export subsidies might be prohibited
in areas like initial engineering consultation).
3. Supporting Arrangements. Although it is still difficult to
imagine a global version of the European Communities' effort to
coordinate educational structures and professional admissions
standards, it is important for the parties to any professional services trade agreement to encourage international coordination
among the relevant professional groups. This could help move toward harmonization; it could also help in efforts to define specific
procedures for providing transient services or even to establish
safeguards. Most of all, it could increase the non-economic benefits
of international professional trade and could strengthen professional autonomy at a time when that autonomy would otherwise be
under attack.
4. Dispute Settlement. Finally, as noted above, the GATT
dispute settlement procedures are not strong enough to meet the
requirements of this area. A GATT-type pattern might wisely begin with the use of international committees built from the global
professional associations-as being more sensitive to professional
concerns, and ultimately more neutral and global, than government officials. But it is also important to strengthen the national
remedies available before an issue becomes international. Thus,
each nation might guarantee to all foreign nationals (and, if it prefers, to its own citizens as well) that it will provide a due-process
based approach by which such foreign nationals can test their right
to obtain access to the profession. This type of right would have
helped immensely in a situation like that decribed above for Japan; it might also be a useful model for the world.
C.

Negotiating Frameworks

The most important question on the structure of negotiations
is whether to work multilaterally or bilaterally. The strongest argument for a bilateral approach is that the sensitive visa issues have
typically been handled bilaterally in FCN contexts. Moreover, in
the bilateral context, each party to an agreement encouraging
trade in professional services can more readily ensure that its partners are those whose professionals provide high-quality services.
Nevertheless, these arguments do not carry the day. There is
great virtue to a multilateral agreement maintaining freedom of
trade in professional services. First of all, the wisest negotiating
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goals may turn out to be extremely broad. The political issue may
currently be legal services in Japan, but there may soon be many
more examples of restrictions on the importation of legal services,
even in Europe."' And the importance of trade in other service
areas is increasing; in areas such as engineering services, the question of third-party subsidies makes a multilateral approach almost
essential.
Most importantly, however, freedom of trade in professional
services really does provide multilateral benefits. It amounts to a
form of human right. It is critical to commit as many nations as
possible to integrating their professions into an international professional community. The issue begs for a multilateral convention.
The ability to have access to the best medical or legal ideas is a
form 9f political freedom that could be developed from an economic source.
The second question concerns the choice of negotiating forum.
There are alternatives to GATT: the Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development (OECD) could be used to approach other developed nations, or various UN fora could be employed to include the developing nations. Immediate economic interest, together with likely ease of negotiation, favor the OECD
approach. The OECD has already dealt with related areas and,
more recently, has been considering service issues.113
Nevertheless, it is crucial to include the developing nations.
They are major importers-and, in some cases, exporters-of engineering, management, and medical services. Leaving this market
regulated only by third-party and bilateral agreements may well
favor foreign exporters with more interventionist government
strategies. Moreover, many of the developing countries are growth
areas for legal and accounting practice-and this is also the locus
of the greatest non-economic benefits of international professional
4
solidarity.1
.12 Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1773-74 (cited in note 6).
11
For background on the role of the OECD, see Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Economic Stabilization of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
Service Industries: The Changing Shape of the American Economy, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
60-62 (Comm. Print 98-16) (Statement of J. Roslanowick); Steven F. Benz, Trade Liberalization and the Global Service Economy, 19 J. World Trade L. 95, 107-113 (1985).
I" This question of inclusion of developing nations is politically related to the inclusion or exclusion of a freedom of migratory trade in services. The "beneficiaries" of freedom
of migratory trade are the "exporters" of professionals, typically nations such as Egypt and
Sri Lanka. Those who view themselves as making concessions-the U.S. and Great Britain-are the likely "importers," because of their economic attractiveness and their (relatively) open immigration policy. Thus, this form of free trade might appear as a concession
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It follows from this that GATT is the correct framework. Although services are not currently covered by GATT, the substantive issues are quite similar to those traditionally treated in GATT.
And, in comparison with United Nations fora, GATT offers much
wider scope for the complex multi-sector tradeoffs that will be essential for progress in such a sensitive area.
The final question is how to approach the issue within GATT.
Separate negotiations could be held on professional services; alternatively, special professional service provisions could be negotiated
in a variety of different contexts. For example, professional access
rules could be negotiated in the area of technical standards and
special export subsidy provisions could be defined in the area of
subsidies. This latter course would decrease the visibility of the negotiations, a goal which may be desirable to the extent that the
U.S. is more interested in the negotiating result than are its partners. It would also allow the use of other contexts to face the sensitive questions of immigration and visas.
A direct approach is preferable, however. The different negotiating topics associated with trade in professional services are so
complex and so interrelated that they can more practically be
faced together. Moreover, visibility and the creation of a political
focal point may be desirable, because they will be critical as a way
to encourage and build ties with global professional organizations.
These communities may resist at first, but solicitation of their
ideas is the way to begin negotiations, the way to build a constituency, and the way to achieve directly many of the non-economic
benefits sought indirectly through trade negotiations." 15

granted by the North to the South, since such a trade-off might provide a reasonable balance for the openness of the South to multinational and transient practice.
"5 Consider the role of the Secretariat European des Professions Liberales, Intellectuelles et Sociales in assisting European negotiations described in de Crayencour, The Professions at 88 (cited in note 1). For a broader confirmation of the sense that negotiations will
require political action beyond the technical level, see the discussion of the role of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan in Alexander and Tan, U.S. Service Trade at 43-47 (cited in
note 78).

